By : Moneycontrol



After 36 years of service in the Indian army, the government has decided to give over Rs 1 crore in back pay to Field Marshall Sam Maneckshaw. So, does this mean, they are acknowledging that he was shabbily treated? If so, why did that happen and did it have something to do with Maneckshaw himself, or not?

Lieutenant General and former Governor of Goa and Punjab, Chief of staff of the Eastern Command during the Bangladesh campaign, JFR Jacob, who worked closely with Maneckshaw told CNBC-TV18, "The government was less than generous. He went out on a pension of less than Rs 1,300 - which was Rs 100 more than the chief and no perks whatsoever."

In fact, after his retirement, he wasn't even given a car and when he went to Kolkata, it was Lieutenant General Jacob who made a car available for him. And for this simple courtesy, he was ticked off by the then Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram. But Jacod stood by his decision and called it a "courtesy I was extending to all ex-army commanders of the Eastern Command."Jacob served with Maneckshaw in 1961. Maneckshaw was at that time the Commandant of the Staff College in Wellington and Jacob was a member of the teaching staff. It was here that Maneckshaw was accused of anit-national activities and a court of enquiry was appointed to investigate the matter. Jacob was called on to give evidence and he refused.

Jacob recalls this incident and says, "It's not my wont and not in my character to give evidence, so I refused." But he adds, "Had I done so, it might have caused difficulties for Maneckshaw."

The talk going around back then about Sam Maneckshaw was that he would talk loosely. For instance, he would refer to Indians as 'natives' and frequently, he was found publicly critisizing politicians like Krishna Menon or generals - like General Kaul. This story is something that Jacob wouldn't comment on. But it goes without saying that such gossip must have made its way back to the people concerned... and could have alienated Maneckshaw from his colleagues and political bosses as well.

Maneckshaw is also credited for standing up to political pressure in 1971, when the government wanted the army to move into Bangladesh in April but they finally did so in December of that year. But the real story is that he was given some very valid reasons by General Jacob, as to why it was not possible to move out in April.

Jacob explains that he told Maneckshaw that the Eastern Command was a mountain division and there were many rivers and no bridges (to cross) to get into Bangladesh and they did not have the transport for that. Also, the monsoon was just about to begin, so they would have got bogged down. More importantly, international opinion would go against them, so all these factors had to be taken to consideration.

Then there was also the question of how the 1971 war was planned - of whether Dhaka was to be taken or not. Only General Jacob and General Gill agreed that Dhaka had to be made the centre of any plan. But Maneckshaw didn't agree and came back with written orders that not Dhaka, but Khulna and Chittagong was going to be their focus. Besides, Maneckshaw (quite possibly) had not anticipated that the East Pakistan army was going to cave in so quickly.What's gnawing at most of his contemporaries is that, Maneckshaw also did go around claiming that he ran the show singlehandedly during the 1971 war. The insinuation was that the airforce and navy were answering to him, when again, this is not true. Air Chief Marshall PC Lal contradicts that in his book, 'My Years with the IAF', in which he says, "The three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force were left to plan their activities, as they thought best." This is something that General Jacob admits is true.

So, ultimately, General Jacob had to heed orders and he moved three brigades from the Chinese border, which made Maneckshaw furious. He insisted that they be moved back and the then DMO, General Inder Gill made him promise that he (Jacob) wouldn't employ those troops in Bangladesh without permission from them. Jacob says, he was denied permission for five days after the war started. He believes Dhaka would have fallen sooner, had he been allowed to use the troops under his command.